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Abstract 
The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) is the pursuit of less efficiency by firms. In this study, we 
assess if powerful banks in the African banking industry are increasing financial access. The 
QLH is therefore consistent with the pursuit of financial intermediation inefficiency by large 
banks. To investigate the hypothesis, we first estimate the Lerner index. Then, using Two 
Stage Least Squares, we assess the effect of the Lerner index on financial access proxied by 
loan price and loan quantity. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 
African countries for the period 2001-2011. The findings support the QLH, although quiet life 
is driven by the below-median Lerner index sub-sample. Policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: D40; G20 ; G29 ; L10 ; O55 
Keywords: Financial access; Bank performance; Africa 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There are three main motivations for the positioning of this study: (i) surplus liquidity issues 
in African financial institutions and limited financial access to households and corporations  
(Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014, p.70);  (ii) recent claims that banks in Africa, 
instead of enhancing financial access, have been enjoying  a “quiet life” (Asongu et al., 
2016a; Boateng et al., 2018) and (iii) gaps in the literature  because the existing bulk of 
studies  on “quiet life” in the banking industry has failed to engage the African continent.  The 
Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) is a postulation that large financial institutions would invest less 
in enhancing financial access through the pursuit of intermediation efficiency. According to 
the hypothesis, instead of using their favourable market position to increase the quantity of 
loans and/or decrease the price of loans, such financial institutions tend to exploit such market 
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advantages from their large size to improve their gains or enjoy a “quiet life” (Coccorese & 
Pellecchia, 2010). 
 The literature accords with the perspective that relative to large banks, small banks are 
associated with lower interest margins (see Beck & Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013). For 
instance: the size of a bank substantially influences interest spread/variations in the banking 
sector (Beck & Hesse, 2006);  big banks are related to a higher cost of loans (see Ngigi, 
2013a, 2013b) and in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), competition-friendly policies reduce the 
price of loans because they enhance interbank competition (Ahokpossi, 2013).  
 From a theoretical perspective, however, large banks with substantial market influence 
are expected to be linked to lower interest margins owing to internal and external economies 
of scale. Unfortunately, big banks have been associated with financial allocation inefficiency 
because they contribute to reduce financial access (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). Three main 
narratives have been provided to elucidate this paradox in the recent financial development 
literature: (1) Large banks could be employing credit information agencies (such as private 
credit bureaus and public credit registries) to boost their profit margins (Brown & Zehnder, 
2010; Asongu et al., 2016b). (2) Large financial institutions are also associated with 
diseconomies of scale which engender management, organisational and coordination 
inefficiencies (Mester, 1992; Clark, 1996; Karray & Chichti, 2013). (3) Big banks could be 
more focused on enjoying a ‘quiet life’ than on leveraging on their positions to boost financial 
intermediation efficiency (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Boateng et al., 2018). The positioning 
of the study falls within the framework of the third dimension. Hence, by investigating the 
QLH, we seek to clarify whether big banks are reducing financial access by increasing interest 
margins (price of loans) and reducing credit availability (quantity of loans).  
In the light of the above, the positioning of the inquiry also complements a recent 
strand of African financial literature that is based on claims that big banks are associated with 
less financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Barth et al., 2009; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017)2.  
The complementary character of this study is based on the fact that claims from the 
underlying literature are founded on policy inferences of indirect nature. This is essentially 
because specific “quiet life” indicators are not directly engaged. We directly assess how banks 
                                                          
2
 Moreoover, the bulk of recent financial development literature on Africa has not focused on market power in 
the banking industry  (Daniel, 2017; Fowowe, 2014; Wale & Makina, 2017;  Chikalipah, 2017; Bocher et al., 
2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Iyke & 
Odhiambo, 2017; Boadi et al., 2017).  
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with strong influence in the banking industry affect financial access in order to bridge the 
identified gap.  
Noticeably from existing literature on the QLH summarised in Table 1, the African 
continent has not been given the scholarly attention it deserves, despite being the region with 
comparatively more issues of financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). In essence, with the 
exception of Ariss (2010), who has included a few African countries, the  majority of studies 
have failed to engage Africa.   
 
Table 1: Summary of empirical literature 
Author(s) Regions (Period) Quiet Life Hypothesis(QLH) 
   
Tu & Chen (2000)  Taiwan (1986-1999) Yes 
   
Weill (2004) Europe (1994-1999) No 
   
Maudos & de Guevara (2007) Europe (1993-2002) No 
   
Koetter & Vins (2008) Germany (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Koetter et al. (2008) USA (1986-2006) No 
   
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) Czech Republic (1994-2005)  No 
   
Schaeck & Cihak (2008) Europe & USA (1995-2005) Yes 
   
Al-Jarrah & Gharaibeh (2009) Jordan (2001-2005) No 
   
 
Solis & Maudos (2008)  
 
Mexico (1993-2005) 
No (for deposit market) 
Yes (for loans market) 
   
Al-Muharrami & Mathews (2009)  Arab Gulf (1993-2002) No 
   
Fan & Marton (2011) SEE  (1998-2008) No 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009) China (1985-2002) No 
   
Delis & Tsionas (2009) Europe (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009)  China (1985-2002) No 
   
Punt &van Rooij(2009) EU (1992-1997) No 
   
Ariss (2010) A sample of developing countries 
(1999-2005) 
Yes (cost efficiency) 
 No (profit efficiency) 
   
Coccorese & Pellecchia (2010) Italy (1992-2007) Yes 
   
Tetsushi et al. (2012) Japan (1974-2005) Yes 
   
Titko & Dauylbaev (2015) Baltic countries (2007-2013) No 
   
Sources: Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010); Titko and Dauylbaev (2015) and Author. SEE: South East European countries. EU: Europe 
Union. QLH: Quiet Life Hypothesis.  
 
 In order to assess the QLH in the African banking industry, two main hypotheses are 
investigated:  
H1: The Lerner index reduces financial access. 
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H2: The negative effect of the Lerner index on financial access is higher in the above-median  
Lerner index sub-sample.  
 In order for the hypotheses to be confirmed, we expect the Lerner index to increase 
loan price and reduce loan quantity. Using Two Stage Least Squares, we assess the effect of 
the Lerner index on financial access proxied by loan price and loan quantity. The empirical 
evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 African countries for the period 2001-
2011. 
The findings support the QLH, although quiet life is driven by the below-median Lerner index 
sub-sample. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is valid while Hypothesis 2 is rejected.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology.  Section 3 covers the empirical results while Section 4 presents concluding 
implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data 
The paper examines a panel of 162 banks with data for the period 2001-2011 from 42 African 
countries. The data is from African Development Indicators of the World Bank and 
Bankscope. The adopted periodicity, number of banks and number of countries are due to 
constraints in data availability.  
 In accordance with recent banking literature (see Ariss, 2010; Boateng et al., 2018), 
we use the Lerner index as a proxy for banks with substantial market influence. The index 
measures the degree to which banks set prices above marginal cost. It follows that a higher 
index reflects a greater monopolistic tendency. The computation of the index is discussed in 
sub-Section 2.2.1.  
 Financial access (or the dependent variable) is measured in terms of loan price and 
loan quantity with respectively ‘price charged on loans’ and ‘logarithms of loans’ (Coccorese 
& Pellecchia , 2010;  Asongu & Le Roux, 2016). Three main sets of control indicators are 
adopted by the study, namely: (i) market-oriented characteristics (GDP per capita growth, 
Inflation and population density); (ii) bank-related characteristics (Bank branches and 
Deposit/Assets ratio) and (iii) the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of ownership (domestic 
versus (vs) foreign); size (small vs big) and  ‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs 
non-Islamic). The choice of control variables is consistent with recent literature on financial 
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access (Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Le Roux, 2016).  In what follows we discuss 
expected signs. 
 First, with regard to market-related features, the following signs are anticipated: (1) 
from intuition, rising inflation should decrease the quantity of loans and increase the price of 
loans . In essence, given that investment (and correspondingly loan quantity) is less apparent 
in economic uncertainty periods (e.g. in times of chaotic inflation), the interest charged by 
banks or price of loans is normally adjusted to account for inflation. It is worthwhile to 
mention that investors prefer investing in economic environments that are less ambiguous 
(Kelsey & le Roux, 2017a, 2017b). (2) The density of population is anticipated to affect both 
loan price and loan quantity positively. This is probably because increasing demand for credit 
owing to increasing population density also positively influences the price of credit (or loan 
price). (3) GDP per capita, which is used to control for business cycle fluctuations, is 
projected to positively influence the quantity of loans. Conversely, it is difficult to establish 
the anticipated sign of  loan price, essentially because the effect is contingent on market 
dynamism and expansion.  It is also interesting to note that GDP per capita can influence 
financial access (or both loan quantity and loan price) because of diminishing demand. A 
negative impact is expected from GDP per capita because in Africa, over the past decade, on 
average terms, GDP growth has been growing at a slower rate than population growth 
(Asongu, 2013).  
 Second, in relation to bank-oriented features, the following can be anticipated: (1)  the 
number of bank branches intuitively has a positive (negative) influence of loan quantity (loan 
price). (2) Both loan quantity and loan price are expected to increase with the ‘deposit/asset’ 
ratio. This is probably because the principal source of resources for banks is mobilised 
financial deposits. Hence, a greater proportion of liquid liabilities can increase interest rate 
margins and/or loan quantity, since good organisation is imperative for effective management 
and adequate mobilisation of financial deposits.  
 Third, it is very difficult to establish expected effects from the three dummy variables 
used to control for the unobserved heterogeneity for the following reasons. (1) Regardless of 
bank size (big vs small), financial institutions can be related to both positive and negative 
impacts from dynamics of loans, albeit financial institutions with comparatively large sizes 
are more linked to issues of management and coordination. Furthermore, it is important to 
address challenges which are inherently linked to growing bank size such as inefficiency, 
partly owing to issues that banks could encounter when trying to resolve conflicts associated 
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with customer needs and requirements. (2) Within the same logical framework, the roles of 
heterogeneity in ownership (domestic vs foreign) and compliance with ‘Sharia finance’ 
(Islamic vs Non-Islamic) depend on a multitude of features, among others: market dynamism, 
organisational capacities and market expansion.  
 A tabular summary of expected signs from the control indicators is revealed in 
Appendix 1, whereas the definition and sources of data are disclosed in Appendix 2.     The 
corresponding correlation matrix and summary statistics are provided in Appendix 4 and 
Appendix 3 respectively.                    
 
2.2 Methodology  
We are investigating the quiet life hypothesis (QLH), which is the pursuit of less efficiency by 
firms. Within the framework of this study, the QLH is consistent with the pursuit of financial 
intermediation inefficiency by banks with monopolistic power. To investigate the hypothesis, 
we first estimate the Lerner index. Then, using the Two Stage Least Squares estimation 
strategy, we examine the effect of the Lerner index on financial access proxied with loan price 
and loan quantity. 
 
2.2.1 Estimation of  the Lerner Index 
 A stochastic frontier model is employed to estimate the Lerner index.  
The use of the approach is in accordance with a bulk of literature on the subject (Battese & 
Coelli, 1992; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Boateng et al., 2018). With respect to  Coccorese 
and Pellecchia (2010), when compared with alternative estimation strategies that are founded 
on deterministic frontiers (Aigner & Chu, 1968; Farrell, 1957), the adopted estimation 
approach is more efficient.  The selected modelling technique accounts for: the likelihood 
that, beside business inefficiencies, variations between the observed output and frontier 
outcome can be founded on characteristics such as stochastic shocks and measurement errors.  
 Let us suppose that for bank i  at time t , production costs are  contingent on output 
( Q ), input prices (W ), random error ( v ) and inefficiency ( u ). If the related random error 
and inefficiency terms are identically and independently distributed (iid), then the logarithmic 
specification reflecting the cost function can be provided as follows: 
 
 ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln
 ,                                                                                  (1)    
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where the error term and non-negative inefficiency terms are iid, and respectively follow a 
normal distribution and a truncated normal distribution. Hence, whereas itv  is ²),0( vN  , itu  
is ²),( uN  .       
Cost is then estimated with the translog cost function. It encompasses three inputs and one 
output. The translog cost function has been widely used in both non-contemporary 
(Christensen et al., 1971; Brown et al., 1979) and contemporary  (Koetter & Vins, 2008; 
Ariss, 2010;  Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Boateng et al., 2018) literature. 
 
The cost function is as follows:  
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where Ni ,........1  and  Tt .........1 , are respectively subscripts of banks and time.
 
C denotes the total cost,  Q  represents the output, hW entail factor prices, while itu  and itv  
are the error and inefficiency terms respectively.  
 One output and three inputs are specified while estimating the cost. The following 
variables are used to measure the total operation cost: total operating cost proxied by 
overheads, inputs by deposits price, output by total assets, price of capital and price of 
labour3. 
 As emphasised in Eq. (4), the Lerner index is then estimated from the marginal cost 
and price. Whereas the former is obtained from the output of a translog cost function (see Eq. 
(3)), the latter represents the price that is charged by banks on their output or total assets. It is 
calculated as the ratio of total revenues (net interest income plus noninterest income) to total 
assets.  
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3
 The price of labour is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The deposit price is derived by 
dividing interest expenses with the sum of deposits, short-term finance plus money market. The price of capital 
is equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets.  
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where itP  is the price that a bank charges on its output. From a theoretical perspective, the 
Lerner index ranges from 0 (in a scenario of perfect competition) and 1.  
 
2.2 2 Instrumentation and Two Stage Least Squares estimations   
  
 After computing the Lerner index, a simultaneity-robust Two Stage Least Squares 
approach that further controls for the unobserved heterogeneity is employed. The issue about 
simultaneity (in endogeneity) is tackled by intstrumenting the Lerner index with its first lag. 
Hence,  the process of instrumenting the Lerner index is disclosed in Eq. (5) below. 
  tiitijti LILI ,1,,   
 
 ,                                                                                              (5) 
where tiLI , , is the Lerner index of bank i
 
at  period t ,    is a constant, 1, tiLI , represents  
the Lerner index in bank i
 
at  period 1t , 
 
i
 
is the bank-specific effects and ti ,  the error 
term.  
 The instrumentation process in Eq. (5) consists of regressing the Lerner index on its 
first lag and then saving the fitted values which are then employed as the independent variable 
of interest in the second stage of the Two Stages Least Squares process. The specification is  
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in terms of standard errors. 
 The second-stage of Two Stage Least Squares process is presented in Eq. (6) below.  
tiitih
h
htiti WMPLQ ,,,
5
1
,10,    

  ,                                             (6)                                               
where tiLQ ,
 
is Loan quantity  of bank i
 
at  period t ,  is a constant,
 
MP  denotes 
instrumented the Lerner index.
 
W  is the vector of control variables (GDP per capita growth, 
Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches)),
 
i
 
is the bank-specific effects 
(Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks) and ti ,  the error term.  
 
3. Empirical results 
  
Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present baseline Ordinary Least Squares and Two Stage 
Least Squares. The former is performed without the instrumentation process whereas the latter 
entails the process of instrumentation outlined in Eq. (5). For either table, the left-hand side 
shows estimations corresponding to the price of loans whereas the right-hand-side reveals 
estimations related to the quantity of loans. For either dependent variable, three specifications 
are apparent, one on the full sample and two on above-median and below-median Lerner 
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index sub-samples. The choice of a median cut-off point is motivated by the need to have 
comparable sub-samples. Whereas the full sample enables us to assess Hypothesis 1, 
comparing the Lerner index from the two sub-samples provides insights into whether 
Hypothesis 2 is valid or not.  
 From Table 2, Hypothesis 1 is validated because the Lerner index increases 
(decreases) the prices of loans (quantity of loans). Hence, by decreasing financial access, the 
Lerner index contributes to financial intermediation inefficiency. Hypothesis 2 is not 
confirmed because opposite effects are apparent in the above-median Lerner index sub-
sample. It follows that the QLH is fundamentally driven by banks with comparatively lower 
Lerner indices or the below-median Lerner index sub-sample. Most of the significant control 
variables have the expected signs.  
 
Table 2: Baseline Ordinary Least Squares  
       
 Dependent Variable: Financial Access 
       
 Price of Loans Quantity of Loans 
 Full Sample  Lerner ≤ Median Lerner >Median Full Sample  Lerner ≤ Median Lerner >Median 
Constant  0.099*** 0.084*** 0.188*** 3.510*** 4.448*** 0.735 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) 
Lerner index 0.006*** 0.008*** -0.111*** -0.090** -0.077** 2.383*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.012) (0.014) (0.001) 
GDPpcg 
-0.0005 -0.001* -0.0001 -0.020* -0.041** -0.003 
 (0.165) (0.055) (0.805) (0.061) (0.031) (0.786) 
Inflation  0.0001* 0.0002* 0.00008 0.002 -0.0009 0.003*** 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.255) (0.176) (0.667) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00003*** 0.00006** 0.00001 -0.0009*** -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.202) (0.002) (0.023) (0.003) 
Deposit/Assets 0.011 0.043*** -0.020* 2.093*** 1.772*** 2.312*** 
 (0.168) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.046*** -0.089*** -0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Small Banks  0.008** 0.001 0.012*** -0.756*** -0.924*** -0.346** 
 (0.033) (0.775) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) 
Domestic Banks 0.004 0.002 0.008** 0.307*** 0.029 0.765*** 
 (0.173) (0.498) (0.049) (0.003) (0.830) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  
-0.021*** -0.019** -0.014 -0.425** -0.687*** -0.069 
 (0.001) (0.026) (0.312) (0.002) (0.008) (0.762) 
       
Adjusted  R² 0.112 0.216 0.129 0.195 0.279 0.220 
Fisher  14.16*** 10.94*** 6.83*** 36.73*** 22.12*** 33.47*** 
Observations  748 346 402 748 346 402 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. The median of the Lerner index 
is: 0.58822. 
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Table 3: Two Stage Least Squares  
       
 Dependent Variable: Financial Access 
       
 Price of Loans Quantity of Loans 
 Full Sample  Lerner ≤ Median Lerner >Median Full Sample  Lerner ≤ Median Lerner >Median 
Constant  0.110*** 0.100*** 0.510*** 3.743*** 4.461*** -3.149 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.204) 
The Lerner index 
(IV) 
-0.002 0.008 -0.674*** -0.489*** -0.430*** 9.757** 
 (0.753) (0.132) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016) 
GDPpcg 
-0.0006 -0.001** -0.0003 -0.017 -0.009 -0.013 
 (0.120) (0.018) (0.501) (0.168) (0.624) (0.377) 
Inflation  0.0001 0.00008 0.0001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.120) (0.428) (0.108) (0.121) (0.396) (0.329) 
Pop. density 0.00002* 0.00004* 0.000009 -0.0009*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.062) (0.080) (0.512) (0.004) (0.031) (0.014) 
Deposit/Assets 0.005 0.032** -0.018* 2.106*** 1.850*** 2.242*** 
 (0.563) (0.010) (0.088) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.047*** -0.081*** -0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.007* -0.0009 0.009** -0.743*** -0.947*** -0.365** 
 (0.080) (0.884) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) 
Domestic Banks 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.328*** 0.082 0.699*** 
 (0.302) (0.231) (0.203) (0.003) (0.593) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  
-0.022*** -0.027*** -0.008 -0.499** -0.834*** -0.110 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.552) (0.019) (0.009) (0.640) 
       
Adjusted  R² 0.122 0.191 0.164 0.202 0.267 0.212 
Fisher  9.59*** 7.38*** 7.16*** 32.22*** 17.17*** 18.60*** 
Observations  621 287 334 621 287 334 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. The median of  the IV Lerner 
index is: 0.57200. 
 
 
4. Concluding implication and future research directions  
 
One of the most serious challenges to do business in Africa is a lack of finance, which is 
compounded by surplus liquidity issues in financial institutions of the continent. In order to 
finance its growing investment needs, enhanced financial access represents an important 
policy concerns for the continent.  
Building on concerns raised in a recent strand of the literature as well as apparent gaps 
in the engaged literature, this study has assessed if powerful banks in the African banking 
industry are enjoying a quiet life by reducing financial access. The Quiet Life Hypothesis 
(QLH) is consistent with the pursuit of financial intermediation inefficiency by banks with 
such high market share and/or substantial market influence. To investigate the hypothesis, we 
have first estimated the Lerner index. Then, using Two Stage Least Squares, we have 
examined the effect of the Lerner index on financial access proxied by loan price and loan 
quantity. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 countries for the 
12 
 
period 2001-2011. The findings support the QLH, although quiet life is driven by the below-
median Lerner index sub-sample.  
 The findings confirm the recommendation of Ariss (2010) that, increased market 
influence by large banks should be welcomed in developing countries in order to enhance 
bank soundness. This is essentially because the relevance of large banks on financial access 
depends on the degree of market influence, with banks with above-median Lerner index 
increasing financial access whereas their counterparts with below-median Lerner index have 
decreasing financial access. An immediate implication is that blanket policies based on mean 
values of the Lerner index may not be effective unless they are contingent on existing levels 
of the Lerner index and hence, tailored differently across banks with varying levels of Lerner 
indices. A possible reason why banks with above-median “Lerner index” behave differently 
from their below-median “Lerner index” counterparts may be the economies of scale 
associated with bank size. It will be interesting for future research to ascertain this inference. 
Moreover, investigating the interaction of the Lerner index with complementary mechanisms 
(that are theoretically designed to reduce information asymmetry and enhance financial 
access) is another relevant future research outlet. Such channels include: information sharing 
offices (such as private credit bureaus and public credit registries) and information and 
communication technologies.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of expected signs  
 
 
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
    
Bank-oriented 
features  
Deposit/Asset ratio   + + 
Bank Branches  - + 
    
Market-related 
characteristics  
GDP per capita growth Uncertain  + 
Population density  + + 
Inflation  + - 
    
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus(vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Market Influence  Lerner index The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Loan Quantity   Quantity Logarithm of Loans  Quantity BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Population density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
Appendix 3: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Market 
Influence  
Lerner 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix  
               
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Financial Access Dummy-Controls Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl.   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 Lerner 
               
Info: Information. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small banks. 
 Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans.  
Lerner: Market Influence.  
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